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BUCKHANNON, SPECIAL EDUCATION DISPUTES, AND

ATTORNEYS' FEES:
TIME FOR A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AGAIN

Stefan R. Hanson*
I. INTRODUCTION

Federal civil rights statutes, including the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (hereinafter, IDEA or Act), 1 often
have provisions permitting courts to award attorneys' fees to
prevailing plaintiffs. Congress intended these fee-shifting
provisions to encourage plaintiffs to act as private attorneys
general in enforcing these statutes. Implementing that intent,
the federal courts, with the exception of those in the Fourth
Circuit, 2 have used a so-called "catalyst theory" to determine
whether a plaintiff qualified as a prevailing party for purposes
of attorney fee-shifting provisions in civil rights statutes.
Under the catalyst theory, if plaintiffs could demonstrate a
causal connection between their bringing suit and a
corresponding change in defendants' behavior, then plaintiffs
qualified as "prevailing parties" for purposes of attorney feeshifting provisions. The catalyst theory did not require a
judgment in plaintiffs' favor, a judicially sanctioned consent
decree, or even a formal settlement.
In Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, 3 the Supreme
Court of the United States rejected the catalyst theory.
Buckhannon held that to qualify as a "prevailing party," a
party must achieve some form of judicial imprimatur of
success, such as an enforceable judgment on the merits or a
*Ph.D. (New York University), J.D. (Chapman University, expected May 2003).
The author wishes to thank Professor Celestine R. McConville and Dr. Amy E. Hurley
for their invaluable assistance in developing this paper.
1. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17
(1997), 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2002)).
2. See S-1 & S-2 v. St. Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 1994).
3. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
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court-ordered consent decree. 4 A private settlement would not
qualify. 5
Buckhannon involved the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 (FHAA)6 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA). 7 However, lower courts, following the Supreme Court's
lead, 8 have applied Buckhannon's holding widely, including to
special education litigation brought under the IDEA. In IDEA
litigation, parents and guardians pursue their disabled
children's rights to a "free and appropriate public education"
(FAPE) through various means: state-level administrative
mechanisms of compliance complaints, mediation, due process
hearings, and lawsuits in federal courts. Congress intended
that the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA would promote its
enforcement, ensuring that the approximately 6.1 million
disabled American children, or 12.5% of the children currently
enrolled in public school, 9 have equal access to FAPE.
This note examines the impact of Buckhannon on IDEA
litigation, arguing that Buckhannon undermines the role of the
IDEA fee-shifting provisions in the enforcement of the IDEA.
Under the Buckhannon regime, plaintiffs risk incurring
attorneys' fees far in excess of the value of their claims; even if
they ultimately obtain all of the relief they originally sought.
Inevitably, parents will bring fewer claims, however
meritorious, and more children will be denied the opportunity
for F APE. In time, fewer disabled children will mature into
self-sufficient, independent adults-an individual and societal
harm that Congress intended the IDEA to remedy.

4. Id. at 604.
5. Id. at 604 n. 7.
6. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430 (1988), 102
Stat. 1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2002)).
7. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336 (1990), 104
Stat. 32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2002)).
8. Chief Justice Rehnquist's introduction in Buckhannon recognizes its holding
would be much more widely applied: "Numerous federal statutes allow courts to award
attorneys' fees and costs to the 'prevailing party.' The question presented here is
whether this term includes a party that has failed to secure a judgment on the merits
or a court-ordered consent decree, but has nonetheless achieved the desired result
because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct. We
hold that it does not." 532 U.S. at 600.
9. Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Off. of Educ. Research & Improvement, U.S.
Dept. of Educ., Common Core of Data, America's Public Schools, Statistics for Year
2000, <http://nces.ed.gov/ccdfbat/index/asp> (accessed Jan. 14, 2003).
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Buckhannon also discourages the early resolution of
disputes. So even though parents now may initiate fewer
disputes, those that they do initiate are likely to be protracted.
As previously stated, to obtain attorneys' fees, plaintiffs must
emerge as prevailing parties. Since Buckhannon requires a
court-ordered judgment or consent decree for prevailing party
status, plaintiffs are less likely to seek settlement, instead
choosing to persevere to judgment to obtain reimbursement of
their attorneys' fees. Defendants are also less likely to seek
early resolution of disputes. At any time up until judgment,
defendants can provide plaintiffs the relief they seek, thus
mooting plaintiffs' cases, and thereby denying plaintiffs
prevailing-party status and attorneys' fees. If the defendants
do this, plaintiffs will have their relief, but will be responsible
for their own attorneys' fees. In many cases, the costs to a
disabled child's family will be considerable, unjust, and
contrary to the intent of the IDEA. The overall effect will be to
protract that IDEA litigation that does occur.
The recent case of J.C., a Connecticut teenager, illustrates
the detrimental impact of Buckhannon on the IDEA's
mandate.l 0 In 1995, J.C.'s worried parents asked the school
district to evaluate J.C. to determine his possible eligibility for
The school district did not
special education services.n
comply.l 2 In 1997, the parents repeated their request, and,
after a meeting, the school district found J. C. ineligible. 13 In
1998, J.C. vandalized a school bus, and the school district
scheduled an expulsion hearing. 14 In response, J.C.'s family
hired an attorney who filed for due process hearing under the
IDEA to address whether the school district should provide J.C.
special education rather than expel him. 15 The school district
then met with J.C.'s parents and their attorney and reached a
settlement agreement in which J.C.'s parents obtained all the
relief they had sought in their due process filing. 16
Subsequently, J.C. and the school district convened the due
process hearing solely for the purpose of adopting the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

J.C. v. Bd. of Educ., 278 F .3d 119 (2d Cir. 2002).
Id. at 121
Id.
Id. at 121-122.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
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agreement as an official decision and orderY At the hearing,
however, the school district refused to cooperate with this
process, causing the hearing officer to issue a final written
decision dismissing the hearing issues as moot. 18 The school
district then proceeded to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement. 19
When the school district refused to pay J.C.'s attorneys'
fees, his parents flied suit in federal district court seeking
attorneys' fees as a prevailing party under the IDEA. 20
Applying the catalyst theory, the District Court awarded J.C.'s
parents nearly $14,000 in attorneys' fees. 21 Following the
District Court's decision, the Supreme Court decided
Buckhannon. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
retroactively applied Buckhannon to J.C.'s case and reversed
the District Court, 22 in effect rendering J.C.'s parents
responsible for their own attorneys' fees.
J. C. illustrates how Buckhannon has shifted the costs and
risks associated with IDEA enforcement onto the families of
disabled children. As J.C. shows, parents who initiate an
IDEA dispute, or accept an early resolution of an IDEA
dispute, risk substantial attorneys' fees even when they prevail
entirely. This new regime creates incentives inconsistent with
the goals of the IDEA and thwarts congressional intent. Since
the claims in IDEA litigation are often equitable or relatively
small in value, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees may approach or
exceed the value of the relief obtained. Congress did not intend
for families of disabled children, acting as private attorneys
general, to shoulder such a degree of risk in the assertion of
their children's right to a FAPE. Instead, Congress intended to
encourage the filing of meritorious claims.
Overall,
Buckhannon's effect is to deny more disabled children, an
especially vulnerable minority, their constitutional right to a
FAPE.
The remainder of this note discusses these ideas in greater
detail. Part II reviews the legislative history of the IDEA, and
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

ld.
ld.

Id. at 122.
Id.
J.C. v. Reg!. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 115 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D. Conn. 2000),
overruled, 278 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2002).
22. J.C., 278 F.3d at 125.
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Part III discusses the history of attorney fee-shifting provisions
in the IDEA. Part IV then reviews the Buckhannon decision
and its impact on IDEA litigation. Finally, Part V discusses
judicial solutions to the Buckhannon problem and ultimately
argues that congressional remedial action is necessary to
preserve disabled children's educational rights, and toward this
end, it proposes a legislative remedy.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT

Federal law currently requires the states to provide the
same educational opportunities to children with disabilities as
they do to children without disabilities. Protection for children
with disabilities essentially began with the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA). 23 Prior to that
time, there was little commitment to the education of
handicapped children in the states' public school systems.
While Congress has amended the law several times over the
years, it has remained committed to the goal of providing equal
educational opportunities for disabled children by offering
funding to states for the education of disabled children in
public schools. 24
This legislative commitment to the education of disabled
children emerged over time from an interweaving of general
civil rights legislation and legislation specifically designed to
protect the disabled. Even early civil rights legislation, dating
back to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 25 still has relevance for the
equal protection claims of disabled children to a F APE.
Historically, however, the EAHCA is more closely associated
with the civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s.
Legislation associated with the EAHCA included the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 26 the first significant civil rights law
to address the issue of discrimination against the disabled.
Before the Rehabilitation Act, federal efforts to help the

23. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-192
(1975), 89 Stat. 773, (also known as the Education of the Handicapped Act (ERA)).
24. Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped Act:
A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 349 (1990).
25. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
26. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112 (1973) (codified, as
amended, at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2002)).
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disabled had not addressed civil rights per se, but instead had
focused on vocational rehabilitation. The most important
provision of the Rehabilitation Act is Section 504, which
provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual
in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiVmg Federal financial assistance." 27
While the
Rehabilitation Act originally sought to end employment
discrimination against the handicapped, 28 the broad language
of Section 504 has had the effect of protecting the handicapped
from discrimination in nearly all situations in which a
potential discriminator receives federal financial assistance. 29
Section 504 prohibits the denial of "benefits of ... any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" and still
serves to protect the disabled from discrimination in education
as well as employment and other "activities or programs" that
receive federal funds. 30 In 1978, the Department of Health
Education and Welfare issued regulations to implement
Section 504 that specifically stated that disabled children were
entitled to "free and appropriate" educational opportunities and
that "services should be designed to meet the individual
educational needs of handicapped persons." 31
As with the Rehabilitation Act, the EAHCA reflects
congressional intent in the 1970s to guarantee equal rights to
persons with disabilities. The Rehabilitation Act focused on
expanding and improving the tradition of vocational
rehabilitation, 32 while the EAHCA focused on guaranteeing
equal educational opportunity for handicapped children. 33 The
sweep of the Rehabilitation Act, through Section 504, became,

27. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394.
28. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, And Civil Rights: Tracing The
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy For People With Disabilities, 40
UCLA L. Rev. 1341 (1993).
29. Id. at 1385.
30. 87 Stat. at 394.
31. 45 C.F.R § 84.33(a), (b) (1992) (cited in Weber, supra n. 24, at 368).
32. Drimmer, supra n. 28, at 1382.
33. The Senate Report accompanying the EAHCA noted that "[t]his Nation has
long embraced a philosophy that the right to a free appropriate public education is
basic to equal opportunity and is vital to secure the future and the prosperity of our
people." Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 9 (June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1433).
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and has remained, much broader than its vocational roots.
Today, both acts provide overlapping and parallel protections
to children with disabilities. 34
The EAHCA was the first substantial federal commitment
specifically to ensure the access of disabled children to a F APE.
Earlier federal efforts had been less comprehensive and lacked
sufficient funding to support their intent. 35 In 1972, two
groundbreaking federal cases recognized that there was
widespread systemic denial of disabled children's statutory
right to F APE: Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania 36 and Mills v. Board of Education. 31 These two
cases, along with twenty-seven decisions in the several states,
34. For example, The Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education
currently enforces Section 504 and investigates complaints of discrimination by
institutions
rece1vmg
federal
funds,
such
as
schools.
See
<http://www .ed.gov/offices/OCR> (accessed Jan. 14, 2003).
35. These federal legislative efforts included establishing the Bureau of the
Education for the Handicapped in 1966 by amendment to the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-750. Then, in 1971, Congress passed a
separate act, the Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230. The
Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1973 extended the Act for three years
beginning in July 1, 1973. This legislative history is detailed in Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 5
(June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1429).
36. Pa. Assn. for Retarded Children v. Pa., 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Based on the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the court held the proposed consent decree to be fair and reasonable to plaintiff; the
Court prefaced its order by stating, "... [A)pproval means that plaintiff retarded
children who heretofore had been excluded from a public program of education and
training will no longer be so excluded after September 1, 1972. This is a noble and
humanitarian end in which the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has chosen to join.
Today, with the following Order, this group of citizens will have new hope in their
quest for a life of dignity and self-sufficiency." !d. at 302.
37. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). In Mills, the District
Court of the District of Columbia established the constitutional equal protection basis
for access to education of disabled children. The District Court wrote as follows:
The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954), stated: "Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.
Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
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repeatedly affirmed the rights of disabled children to equal
opportunity to a F APE. ss
Responding to this case law, Congress recognized that
"[i]ncreased awareness of the educational needs of handicapped
children ... pointed to the necessity of an expanded Federal
fiscal role." 39 Congress also found "that of the more than 8
million children (between birth and twenty-one years of age)
with handicapping conditions requiring special education and
related services, only 3.9 million such children are receiving a
free and appropriate education. 1. 75 million ... receive no
educational services at all." 40 Earlier statutes did not offer the
states sufficient financial help and incentives to ensure
disabled children received a FAPE.
Under these
circumstances, Congress passed the Education of the
Handicapped Amendments of 1974. 41 These amendments drew
upon the holdings of the federal and state legal cases that
affirmed disabled children's rights to equal education.
Specifically, the amendments provided for substantial
additional financial assistance to the states to identify, locate,
and evaluate all handicapped children. They also provided for
the protection of handicapped children's rights by due process
procedures. 42 These amendments became the basis for the
EAHCA enacted in 1975.
Overall, EAHCA emphasized procedure over substance. To
receive funding under EAHCA, a state had to demonstrate that
it has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children
the right to a free appropriate public education. 43 EAHCA
contained detailed procedures to which states needed to adhere
to demonstrate a compliant policy and to ensure their
eligibility for funding.
Also, EAHCA due process procedures involved detailed
steps for designing a disabled child's education plan and the
resolution of disagreements between parents and local
educational agencies. Congress deliberately relied upon the
38. Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 6 (June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1430).
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 8 (as reported by Bureau of Education for the Handicapped).
41. Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88
Stat. 576 (1974).
42. Sen. Rpt. 94-168, at 6-7 (June 2, 1975) (reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425,
1430-1431).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1975).
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"procedural safeguards of rights as the means to achieve the
broader substantive goal that 'handicapped' children would
receive an 'appropriate' education in integrated settings." 44
Also, a contemporaneous congressional staff member
commented, "[Y]ou have to go for procedural safeguards rather
than substantive things; they're too hard to deal with in
litigation. The judges can deal with procedures." 45 This
congressional focus on the detailed procedures of delivering
FAPE, rather than a focus on the detailed substance of FAPE,
became a hallmark of the EAHCA.
The Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education u.
Rowley46 affirmed the EAHCA emphasis on procedure over
substance. 47 There the Court considered the substantive
meaning of a F APE for a disabled child under the EAHCA. 48
The parents of Amy Rowley, an eight-year old deaf child, had
asked their school district to provide Amy with a sign-language
interpreter for her classroom. 49 The school district declined,
asserting that it had provided other personalized instruction
and related services. 50 Amy's parents maintained that their
school district was denying Amy a F APE by denying her a
classroom interpreter. 51 The District Court and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals found for Amy's parents, but the
Supreme Court reversed. 52
The Supreme Court found that since Amy was performing
above average in school, and since the school district had
offered other accommodations, the EAHCA did not require the
school district to provide Amy with a sign-language interpreter
in order for Amy to receive a F APE. 53 The Court found that a
state satisfied the EAHCA's FAPE requirement when it
provided instruction and services to afford a handicapped child

44. David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities: Educational
Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 Duke L.J. 166, 178 (1991).
45. ld. at 178 (citing D. Neal & D. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered:
The Case of Special Education, 22 (Stan. U. Inst. for Research on Educational Finance
& Governance Rep. No. 82-A27 1983).
46. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
47. ld. at 177.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 184.
50. I d.
51. ld. at 185.
52. ld. at 177.
53. Id. at 185.
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"some educational benefit." 54 It concluded that the EAHCA
intended to confer "some educational benefit" upon a disabled
child, rather than to "maximiz[e] the potential" of the disabled
child. 55 So, as a result, since Rowley, a FAPE for a disabled
child has meant an educational program that confers "some
educational benefit" upon the disabled child. 56
As part of the procedures of the EAHCA, Congress detailed
the requirements for a disabled child's "individualized
educational plan" (IEP). 57 An IEP details the educational
approach intended to meet the unique needs of the disabled
child. The plan would be developed in a meeting attended by
representatives of the local educational agency, the child's
teacher(s), the child's parent(s) or guardian(s), and, where
appropriate, the child. 58 The written IEP document should
contain:
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational
performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual
goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C)
a statement of the specific educational services to be
provided to such child, and the extent to which such
child will be able to participate in regular educational
programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and
anticipated duration of such services, and (E)
appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures
and schedules for determining, on at least an annual
basis, whether instructional objectives are being
achieved. 59
According to the EAHCA, the IEP team must review and
potentially revise the IEP at least annually. 60
In 1990, Congress passed a series of technical amendments
to the EAHCA primarily to replace the term "handicap" with
"disability" and "handicapped" with "disabled." Also, Congress

54. ld. at 200.
55. Id.
56. The substantive standard of "some educational benefit" for a F APE has
remained as the federal standard. Some states have had or have higher substantive
standards. In Michigan, the standard is "to develop the maximum potential" of the
disabled child. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.§ 380.1751(1) (cited in Dong v. Bd of Educ., 197
F.3d 793, 799--800 (6th Cir. 1999)).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1975).
58. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1975).
59. Id.
60. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(5), 1413(a)(ll) (1975).
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renamed the EAHCA the "Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act" (IDEA). 61 These changes left the content of the
Act essentially unchanged.
The due process procedural safeguards of the IDEA
(formerly, the EAHCA) include two primary enforcement
mechanisms designed to protect disabled children's rights to a
FAPE. First, the IDEA specifically provides for impartial due
process hearings 62 with the right of appeal to the district
court.6 3 Other procedural safeguards associated with the
administrative due process hearings include the right to
counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to present,
confront, and compel the attendance ofwitnesses. 64
The second enforcement mechanism is the Complaint
Resolution Process (CRP) at the state level. 65 Under the CRP
regulations, a State Education Agency (SEA) must develop
written procedures to resolve complaints. Typically, although
not always, complaints about the failure of a local educational
agency (LEA) to comply with an agreed-upon IEP are
addressed through the CRP. Disputes regarding the content of
the IEP typically are directed through the administrative due
process hearing procedure. 66 Under the minimum federal
complaint procedures, SEAs must act within 60 days after a
complaint is filed to 1) carry out an independent on-site
investigation; 2) give the complainant the opportunity to
submit additional information about the allegations in the
complaint; 3) review all relevant information and make an
independent determination; 4) issue a written decision with
findings of fact and conclusions; 5) include steps for the

61. Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901, 104 Stat. 1103 (1990).
62. 20 U .S.C. § 1415(f)(l) (1997).
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g), (i) (1997).
64. 20 U .S.C. § 1415(h) (1997).
65. The provisions regarding state level complaint resolution procedures appear
in the IDEA implementing regulations. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-300.662 (1999). See also
20 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(3) (2002) (authorizing the Secretary of Education to " ... make,
promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of
operation of, and governing the applicable programs administered by the
Department").
66. Section 300.661, a newly developed subsection of the IDEA federal
regulations, reflects that some issues may be presented as both complaints and due
process hearings and calls for the SEA to set aside those portions of a complaint that
are also the subject of a due process hearing until the resolution of the hearing. 34
C.F.R. § 300.66l(c) (1999).
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effective implementation of the decision; and 6) provide the
reasons for the SEAs decision. 67
In the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA, Congress
introduced mediation into the specific procedural remedies
offered under the Act. 68 The provisions for mediation required
that 1) the mediation be voluntary, 69 2) the mediation not be
used to delay the parent's right to a due process hearing, 70 3)
the mediation be conducted by a qualified, impartial, and
trained mediator, 71 4) any agreement reached in mediation be
in writing, 72 5) no content of mediation discussions be used in
any subsequent due process hearing, 73 and 6) the state bear the
cost of the mediation.7 4
Two trends foreshadowed the congressional introduction of
mediation into the IDEA procedural safeguards in the 1997
reauthorization. First, many states already had introduced
voluntary mediation procedures into their own special
education procedural safeguards. Second, many concerned
parties had notified Congress that from the perspective of
many school district officials, the IDEA promoted costly
litigation, especially since attorneys' fees for both parties to any
litigation could easily become costs to a school district. 75 Thus,
Congress expressed its intent as follows:
To encourage early resolution of problems whenever
possible, section 615 requires States to offer mediation
as a voluntary option to parents and LEAs as an initial
process for resolving disputes.
However, the bill
requires that a State's mediation system may not be
used to delay or deny a parents right to due process ....
The committee is aware that, in States where mediation
is being used, litigation has been reduced, and parents
and schools have resolved their differences amicably,
making decisions with the child's best interest in mind.

67. 34 C.F.R. § 300.661 (1999).
68. Steven Marchese, Putting Square Pegs Into Round Holes: Mediation and the
Rights of Children With Disabilities Under the IDEA, 53 Rutgers L. Rev. 333, 346
(2001).
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(i) (1997).
70. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (1997).
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(A)(iii) (1997).
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F) (1997).
73. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(G) (1997).
74. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(D) (1997).
75. 143 Cong. Rec. 84354-02 (1997) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
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It is the committee's strong preference that mediation
become the norm for resolving disputes under IDEA.
The committee believes that the availability of
mediation will ensure that far fewer conflicts will
proceed to the next procedural steps, formal due process
and litigation, outcomes that the committee believes
should be avoided when possible. 76

Also, President Clinton at the time had noted that the
introduction of mediation into the procedural safeguards of the
IDEA built upon the success story of the Act. 77

III. THE HISTORY OF A'ITORNEYS' FEES REIMBURSEMENT
PROVISIONS IN THE IDEA
Originally, the EAHCA had no prov1s1on for the
reimbursement of attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs. But
the Civil Rights Act 78 and the Rehabilitation Act, 79 which have
relevance and applicability to the disabled child's assertion of
his or her right to a F APE, have attorney fee-shifting
provisions. The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of
197680 provides for attorneys' fees for a prevailing plaintiff in
76. Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 26-27 (May 9, 1997).
77. 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 147 (Statement by President William J. Clinton upon
signing H.R. 5.).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended, (1996) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973) reads as follows:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as
defmed in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by
any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The section of the act regarding attorneys' fees in
civil rights action, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b) reads as follows:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 198la,
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an action brought under the Civil Rights Act. Also, section 505
of the Rehabilitation Act of 197381 provides for the award of
attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff in an action brought
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Perhaps because
of these fee-shifting provisions, in the early years of the
EAHCA, claims for FAPE brought under the EAHCA also often
included claims brought under both the Civil Rights Act and
the Rehabilitation Act.
In its 1984 decision in Smith u. Robinson, 82 however, the
Supreme Court held that disabled children asserting their civil
rights under the EAHCA could not rely on intertwined or
related claims brought under Section 1983 or Section 504 as a
way of obtaining reimbursement for attorneys' fees. 83 The
Smith Court held that the comprehensiveness and detail of the
EAHCA administrative provisions indicated that Congress did
not intend for disabled children to rely upon statutes other
than the EAHCA, including the Civil Rights Act or the
Rehabilitation Act, as a means to assert their claim to a
F APE. 84 As a result of Smith, disabled children who prevailed
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20
U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42
U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorneys' fee as part of the costs, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs,
including attorneys' fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such
officer's jurisdiction.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1973) reads as follows: "The remedies, procedures, and
rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) et seq.]
shall be available to any person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient
of Federal assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 794 of this
title."
29 USC § 794 a(b) states, "In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of
the costs."
82. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
83. Id. at 1020.
84. Id. at 1020-1021. In response to the broader Smith holding, Congress
amended the IDEA to restore disabled children equal access to the broad range of
federal constitutional and statutory protections. In its 1999 decision Witte v. Clark
County School District, 197 F.3d 1271 (1999), the Ninth Circuit cited to the amended
section, "IDEA§ 1415(1), previously found at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), provides: Nothing in
this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies
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in a claim for F APE brought under the EAHCA had no way of
obtaining reimbursement of their attorneys' fees.
The dissent in Smith argued that the majority misapplied
the principles of statutory construction, 85 and applied an
unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of the Civil Rights and
Rehabilitation Acts. 86 As Justice Brennan asserted in his
dissent:
Congress will now have to take the time to revisit the
matter. And until it does, the handicapped children of
this country whose difficulties are compounded by
discrimination
and
by
other
deprivations
of
constitutional rights will have to pay the costs. It is at
best ironic that the Court has managed to impose this
burden on handicapped children in the course of
interpreting a statute wholly intended to promote the
educational rights of those children. 87
The dissent proved prescient as Congress, in 1986, passed
the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986 (HCPA)
providing authority for the reimbursement of attorneys' fees to
prevailing plaintiffs in claims brought under the EAHCA. 88
The HCPA amended the EAHCA and provided that parents or
guardians of a handicapped child or youth could at the court's
discretion be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees based on the
prevailing rate within the community. 89 These amendments

available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.], Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. § 79[1] et
seq.], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities" 197 F.3d
1271, 1274--1275 (1999). In an accompanying footnote, the Witte court explained the
congressional intent, "[t]his section restored the availability of remedies under the
federal Constitution and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended in
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988), for deprivation of disabled students' education rights, after the
Supreme Court's restrictive decision in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct.
3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984), that such remedies were unavailable. At the same time
Congress reaffirmed the necessity of exhausting the IDEA's administrative procedures
before seeking judicial relief on these alternate theories." Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275 n. 2.
85. Smith, 468 U.S. at 1024.
86. Id. at 1025.
87. Id. at 1031 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat.
796 (1986). The preamble reads: "An Act to amend the Education of the Handicapped
Act to authorize the award of reasonable attorneys' fees to certain prevailing parties, to
clarify the effect of the Education of the Handicapped Act on rights, procedures, and
remedies under other laws relating to the prohibition of discrimination, and for other
purposes."
89. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), (C) (1986).
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prohibited an award if, at least ten days before the due process
hearing, the school district had made a settlement offer to the
parents that the parents rejected and the court or
administrative officer subsequently found that the judgment
for the parents was not more favorable than the settlement
offer, 90 provided the parents were not otherwise substantially
justified in rejecting the settlement offer. 91 These amendments
also offered the court discretion to reduce attorneys' fee awards
if plaintiffs unnecessarily protracted a proceeding or the fees
sought were unreasonable considering the nature of the action
or proceeding. 92 Finally, the amendments authorized the court
to consider whether the defendants had unnecessarily
protracted the proceedings or otherwise had not complied with
the intent of the fee-shifting provisions when considering
plaintiffs' conduct for purposes of awarding fees. 93
The terms "prevailing party" and "reasonable," which
appeared in the HCPA, came to occupy courts in future
litigation regarding attorneys' fees in special education
litigation. In the Senate Report prepared in conjunction with
the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, 94 Congress
stated that it intended the terms "prevailing party" and
"reasonable" to be construed consistently with the Supreme
Court's 1983 decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart. 95 In Hensley, the
Court defined the terms as follows:
The extent of a plaintiffs success is a crucial factor in
determining the proper amount of an award of
attorneys' fees. Where the plaintiff has failed to prevail
on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his
successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful
claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a
reasonable fee. Where a lawsuit consists of related
claims, a plaintiff who has won substantial relief should
not have his attorneys' fee reduced simply because the
district court did not adopt each contention raised. But
where the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (1986).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E) (1986).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(F) (1986).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G) (1986).
Sen. Rpt. 99-112, 1803-04 (July 25, 1985).
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
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district court should award only that amount of fees
that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained. 96
Notably, congressional intent regarding the definitions of
"prevailing parties" and "reasonable" did not change between
this 1985 Senate Report and the 1997 Senate Report
accompanying reauthorization ofthe IDEA in 1997.97
Since the enactment of the HCPA, actual recovery of
attorneys' fees by prevailing parents has varied to some extent
by enforcement mechanism and jurisdiction. In the federal
courts, there has been only one situation, that of attorneyparents representing their own children, in which prevailing
plaintiffs have been unable to recover attorneys' fees for their
IDEA claims. 98 The Fourth Circuit, for example, based its
denial of such fees on a "special circumstances" public policy 99
designed to encourage the "very best representation" for
disabled children pursuing IDEA claims and to avoid the
potential that an emotionally charged parent will inadequately
represent his minor child. 100
Regarding other IDEA enforcement mechanisms, questions
have arisen as to whether they are properly considered
"actions" or "proceedings" as defined in the IDEA attorneys'
fee-shifting provisions. 101 The current judicial consensus is
that administrative due process hearings are "proceedings"
under the IDEA, and that the attorney fee-shifting provisions
of the IDEA apply to disputes resolved at that level without
appeal to the district court. 102
96. Id. at 440.
97. The 1997 Senate Report addresses these issues as follows: "Questions have
been raised regarding the relationship between the extent of success of the parents and
the amount of attorneys' fees a court may award. In addressing this question, the
committee believes the amount of any award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing party
under part B shall be determined in accordance with the law established by the
Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), and its progeny. As we
stated in the 1986 report accompanying the legislation that added the attorneys' fees
provtswns: 'It is the committee's intent that the terms "prevailing party'' and
"reasonable" be construed consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983).'" Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 26 (May 9, 1997); see also
H.R. Rpt. 105-95 (1997).
98. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 165 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1159
(1999). See also, Woodside v Bd. of Educ., 2000 WL 92096 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
99. Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 437 (1991) (cited in Doe, 165 F.3d at 263).
100. Doe, 165 F.3d at 263.
101. 20 U .S.C.§ 1415(i)(3)(B).
102. See e.g. Brown v. Griggsville Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 12 F.3d 681
(7th Cir. 1993), Kletzelman v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 91 F.3d 68, 70 (9th Cir.
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There is a split in the federal courts as to whether
prevailing parents can recover attorneys' fees resulting from
CRPs. The Ninth Circuit and the District Court of Vermont
have held that these procedures are proceedings as per the
IDEA and that attorneys' fees accordingly are recoverable. 103
The District Court of Vermont found that "[a]s a matter of
public policy, disallowing the recovery of attorneys' fees for
work done in CRPs would discourage settlement of IDEA
claims." 104 In contrast, the federal district court in Minnesota
has twice held that CRPs were not an "action or proceeding" for
the purposes of IDEA's attorneys' fees provisions.
The
Minnesota court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit's opposing
holding, but disagreed without any accompanying argument. 105
The Eastern District of New York has also reviewed the split
among the federal courts and found that CRPs are not actions
or proceedings for purposes of the attorney fee-shifting
provisions of the IDEA.lD6
In some instances, courts have awarded parents attorneys'
fees incurred in mediation, without specific contractual
agreement in the settlement, and without a preliminary
request for a due process hearing, provided the parents
obtained some of the relief they were seeking through the
mediation process. 107 Courts awarding these fees for mediation
1996); McSomebodies v. Burlingame Elementary Sch. Dist., 897 F.2d 974, 975 (9th Cir.
1989).
103. Lucht v. Molalla River Sch. Dist., 225 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2000). See also
Upper Valley Assn. for Handicapped Citizens v. Blue Mt. Union Sch. Dist., 973 F. Supp.
429 (D. Vt. 1997).
104. Upper Valley, 973 F. Supp. at 436.
105. Johnson v. Fridley, 2002 WL 334403, 3 (D. Minn. 2002).
106. Vultaggio v. Bd. of Educ., 2002 WL 1889645 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The Vultaggio
court bolstered its decision by noting that the text of the relevant statute had changed
since the Upper Valley Association, 973 F. Supp. 429 (see supra n. 103) decision:
When Upper Valley was decided, Section 1415(b)(6) stated that the
procedures required by the IDEA 'include but shall not be limited to' the
procedures enumerated in that section. Today, .... amended Section
1415(b)(6) states that the procedures required by the IDEA 'shall include'
only the procedures referred the [sic] section-the 'but shall not be limited to'
language was removed.
Vultaggio, 2002 WL 1889645 at 8 (citing Megan C., 57 F. Supp. 2d 776, 784). The
Vultaggio court also found that the informality of CRPs provided a policy reason in
support of the denial of attorneys' fee recovery. Given the contrary holding of Upper
Valley Association, the Vultaggio decision has created a split within the Second Circuit
regarding parents' recovery of attorneys' fees in CRPs.
107. See e.g. E.M. v. Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312 (D.N.J. 1994); Massotti v.
Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F. Supp. 221, 223 (C.D_ Cal. 1992); K.A.L. v. Bd. of

519]

TIME FOR CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

537

work generally relied upon the catalyst theory, which has been
rejected by Buckhannon. 10 B
The so-called catalyst theory developed as part of the
private enforcement of civil rights. For purposes of fee-shifting
provisions contained in civil rights legislation, the catalyst
theory allowed plaintiffs to be considered "prevailing parties"
so long as the plaintiffs could demonstrate a causal connection
between their bringing suit and the change in the defendant's
behavior. 109 As an example, the Third Circuit permitted
recovery as a prevailing party if "(1) the plaintiff obtained relief
on a significant claim in the litigation; and (2) there [was] a
causal connection between the litigation and the relief obtained
from the defendant." 11 0
In special education litigation, the catalyst theory had
become key to the enforcement of the IDEA. Through the
catalyst theory, prevailing parents were able to obtain
attorneys' fees and costs as a result of settlement agreements
and mediation without the requirement that courts or
administrative officers enter case outcomes into the record or
create any form of judicial imprimatur whatsoever. Before
Buckhannon, only the Fourth Circuit had expressly rejected
the catalyst theory in IDEA litigation. 111

IV. THE BUCKHANNON DECISION
A. The Decision
In May 2001, in Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 112 the
Supreme Court 113overruled the common practice of nine federal
circuits to award attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil

Educ .. 1994 WL 327160, 4 (D.N.J. 1994) (cited in Upper Valley, 973 F. Supp. at 435).
108. See e.g. E.M., 849 F. Supp. at 316.
109. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted).
110. P.O. v. Bd. of Educ., 124 F. Supp. 2d 251, 259 (D. N.J. 2000) (quoting Metro
Pittsburgh Crusade for Voters v. City of Pittsburg, 964 F.2d 244, 250 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quoting Dunn v. U. S., 842 F.2d 1420, 1433 (3d Cir. 1988))).
111. See S-1 & S-2, 21 F. 3d 49.
112. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. 598.
113. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Justice Scalia also filed a concurring
opinion in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 599.
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rights litigation under the catalyst theory.ll 4 By rejecting the
catalyst theory, Buckhannon necessarily changed the practice
of shifting attorneys' fees in special education litigation. 115
A 1992 Supreme Court decision, Farrar v. Hobby,
foreshadowed the holding in Buckhannon. 116 In Farrar, a civil
rights case filed under Section 1983, the Court examined how
the term "prevailing party" had come to be defined in civil
rights litigation. 117 The Court noted that "a plaintiff 'prevails'
when actual relief on the merits of [the] claim materially alters
the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the
plaintiff." 118 According to the Court," [n]o material alteration of
the legal relationship between the parties occurs until the
plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent
decree, or settlement against the defendant." 119 In Farrar, the
Court found that the plaintiff was a prevailing party, and
therefore should be eligible for attorneys' fees. 120 However, the
Court held that the nominal damages awarded to the plaintiff
symbolized the lack of success on the merits, and thus, this
particular plaintiff was ineligible to recover attorneys' fees
under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act. 121
Taking its lead from Farrar, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
catalyst theory for Section 1983 claims. In S-1 and S-2 v. State
Board of Education of North Carolina, 122 parents of a disabled
child filed suit against the local school district board as well as
114. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602 n. 3, cites to these examples: Stanton v. S.
Berkshire Regl. Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 574, 577 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1999); Marbley v. Bane, 57
F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 1995); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Housing Authority, 21 F.3d
541, 546-550 (3rd Cir. 1994); Payne v. Bd. of Educ., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996);
Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty.
Sch. Dist., # 1, 17 F.3d 260, 263 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1994); Kilgour v. Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007,
1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951-952 (lOth Cir. 1994); Morris v.
West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999). Justice Ginsburg, in her
dissent, cites to the identical cases as examples of affirmation of the catalyst theory by
a majority of the other Courts of Appeal even after the Fourth Circuit's 1994 rejection
of the catalyst theory in S-1 and S-2. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627 n. 5 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
115. See e.g. J.C., 29 F.3d 119.
116. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 111-112.
119. Id. at 113.
120. Id. at 103.
121. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
122. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d 49.
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the North Carolina State Board of Education and the chairman
of the State Board. After the parents and the local board, but
not the state board or its chairman, entered into a settlement
agreement, the Fourth Circuit judges dismissed the parents'
ongoing case against the State Board and its chairman as moot
because the settlement agreement provided the reimbursement
the parents were seeking.l 23 The remaining issue was whether
the parents were entitled to any attorneys' fees from the state
defendants. 124 The Fourth Circuit, sitting en bane, relied on
the definitions of prevailing party in Farrar to hold that the
parents had no claim for attorneys' fees against the state
defendants for their Section 1983 claims. 125 Until Buckhannon,
however, the Fourth Circuit was alone in interpreting Farrar
as rejecting the catalyst theory; nine other circuits had
affirmed the viability of the catalyst theory after the decision in
Farrar. 126
In Buckhannon, the Buckhannon Corporation operated the
Buckhannon Home, an assisted-living facility in West
Virginia. 127 A State fire marshal sought to enforce West
Virginia fire regulations that required residents of the home to
be capable of moving themselves from situations of imminent
danger such as fire-a
so-called "self-preservation"
requirement. 128 In October 1997, the Buckhannon Corporation
filed a class action suit against the State of West Virginia, two
of its agencies and eighteen individuals seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief that the "self-preservation" requirement
violated the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) 129 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 130 The Buckhannon
Corporation filed the suit in response to an order to close the
Buckhannon home. 131
In 1998, before the case came to
judgment, the West Virginia legislature enacted laws
eliminating the "self-preservation" regulations in controversy
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

!d. at 50
!d. at 50-51.
!d. at 51.
See supra n. 114.
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.
128. !d.
129. !d.; The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.).
130. !d.; The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.).
131. !d. at 600-601.
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rendering the case moot. 132 The Buckhannon Corporation
moved for an award of attorneys' fees based on the fee-shifting
provisions of the FHAA and the ADA according to the catalyst
theory.l 33 Both the FHAA and ADA provide for reimbursement
of attorneys' fees for prevailing plaintiffs. Since the Fourth
Circuit had rejected the catalyst theory in S-1 and S-2, the
District Court denied the motion and the Circuit Court
affirmed. 134
In Buckhannon, the majority began its reasoning by
examining Black's Law Dictionary for the definition of
"prevailing party." 135 According to Black's, the legal definition
of "prevailing party" was "[a] party in whose favor a judgment
is rendered .... "136 The Court reasoned that this dictionary
definition indicated the need for a judicial imprimatur of some
sort before a party could "prevaiL" After examining the
legislative reports accompanying the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act, the Court decided that the legislative history
surrounding attorney fee-shifting provisions was ambiguous as
to congressional support of a catalyst theory.l 37 The Court then
reasoned that, in light of the traditional "American Rule,"
attorneys' fees will not be awarded absent "explicit statutory
authority." 138
This ambiguous legislative history did not
support a catalyst theory. 139 The Court also acknowledged
various policy issues surrounding its decision, including
whether "mischievous defendants" would or could now
unilaterally moot actions to avoid paying attorneys' fees for
prevailing plaintiffs. 140 The majority believed that it need not
weigh these issues fully, however.l 41 Instead, the majority
relied on Black's definition of "prevailing party" to reject the
132. Id. at 601
133. Id.
134. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human
Resources, 203 F.3d 819 (Table of Unreported Decisions) (4th Cir. 2000).
135. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
136. Id. (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 607. Despite the majority's recognition that its holding would be widely
applied, see supra n. 8, no citation to the legislative history of any statute other than §
1983 appears in the Buckhannon decision. So, for example, no reference is made to the
legislative history of the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA, which includes reference
to defining "prevailing party" as in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
138. Id. at 608
139. Id.
140. Id. at 608-09.
141. Id. at 609.
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catalyst theory. 142 As the Court stated, "[g]iven the clear
meaning of 'prevailing party,' we need not determine which
way these various policy arguments cut." 143
B. Interpreting Buckhannon
The unweighed policy issues alluded to in Buckhannon
have come to vex many plaintiffs seeking to enforce their right
to a F APE under the IDEA. Courts implementing Buckhannon
have begun denying plaintiffs reimbursement for their
attorneys' fees even when the plaintiffs have brought
meritorious claims and forced the opposing party to change its
position. In J.S. and M.S. v. Ramapo Central School District, 144
for example, M.S., mother of J.S., a teen with a learning
disability, sought reimbursement from the defendant school
district for a one-year residential placement of J.S. at a private
school. 145 The matter went to hearing and the hearing officer
142. The majority's decision in Buckhannon exemplifies the Court's trend toward
greater use of dictionaries in their decision making. Empirical research on the use of
dictionaries in Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that in the 1992 term, the
Supreme Court had a fourteen-fold increase in citations to dictionary definitions
compared with the 1981 term. Student Author, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and
Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1440 (1994). Overall, the Court's use
of legal dictionaries as ultimate authorities in decision making reflects the current
majority's preference for textualist methods of statutory interpretation. Some observers
have criticized Buckhannon and its use of Black's Law Dictionary as reflecting a form
of hypertextualism that promotes a myth of precision in judicial decision making.
Aviam Soifer, Courting Anarchy, 82 B. U. L. Rev. 699, 726 (2002) (citing Ellen P. Aprill,
The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 Ariz. St. L. J. 275
(1998) (citing David Mellinkoff, The Myth of Precision and the Law Dictionary, 31
UCLA L. Rev. 23 (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Supreme Court's New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative
State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1995))). Soifer notes, in reaction to the Buckhannon
reliance on Black's Law Dictionary for the definitive definition of "prevailing party,"
that "Black's Law Dictionary trumps the Court's own recent dicta, the view of all the
circuit courts except the Fourth Circuit, the statutory civil rights context, and multiple
precedents stretching back into the nineteenth century and carefully marshaled in
Justice Ginsburg's dissent." Soifer, supra, at 726. All these secondary sources cite and
defer to the remarkably succinct assessment of Judge Learned Hand in warning of the
dangers of slavish textualism: "But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and
developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic
and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning." Cabell v. Markham,
148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). For arguments in support of textualism as opposed to
a legislative history approach to statutory interpretation, see William W. Buzbee, The
One-Congress Fiction In Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 171 (2000).
143. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
144. .J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo C. Sch. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
145. ld. at 572-73.
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received some evidence over three days. 146 The school district
then agreed to M.S.'s demands and the case was settled. 147
Neither party sought to have the settlement read into the
record or affirmed in any way by the hearing officer. 148
Applying Buckhannon retroactively, the Southern District of
New York denied the plaintiff prevailing party status and,
therefore, any prospect of fee or cost reimbursement under the
IDEA The District Court relied on Buckhannon's requirement
that any resolution of a case involve some form of judicial
imprimatur before a party may "prevail.'' Citing Buckhannon,
the District Court stated that "(p]rivate settlement agreements
do not confer prevailing party status.'' 149
There is no evidence that the school district in J.S. mooted
the issues for the purpose of avoiding payment of J.S.'s
attorney's fees, but the case history provides a blueprint for
other defendants to use when it appears that they may not win
their case. This approach could be especially effective when
the issues involved concern equitable remedies and the state in
question is one in which hearing officers may not render
settlement agreements as orders or decisions unless both
parties consent. 150
The school district in J.C. v. Board of Education, 151
discussed in the Introduction, followed the J.S. blueprint by
refusing to cooperate to make the settlement an official order.
Together, J.S. and J.C. illustrate the pitfalls awaiting plaintiffs
146. Id. at 576.
147. ld. at 573.
148. Chronologically the case was settled before the Supreme Court's decision in
Buckhannon.
149. J.S. & M.S., 165 F. Supp. 2d at 575 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n. 7,
where the Supreme Court wrote, "Private settlements do not entail the judicial
approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to enforce
a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the
agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.").
150. In Connecticut, it is not clear if under the state's law applicable in J.C.,
whether a settlement agreement may be recorded as a hearing officer's final decision or
order even with the parties' consent. The applicable Connecticut regulation cited by the
hearing officer in J.C. reads, "A settlement agreement shall not constitute a final
decision, prescription or order of the hearing officer. The settlement agreement may be
read into the record as an agreement between the parties only." Conn. Agencies Regs.
§ 10-76h-16(d). Contrast California, where the relevant code reads, "[n]otwithstanding
Government Code section 11415.60 of the Administrative Procedure Act, a decision by
settlement may be issued on terms the parties determine are appropriate so long as the
agreed-upon terms are not contrary to the law." Cal. Code of Regs. Tit. 5, § 3087 (2003).
151. J.C., 278 F.3d 119.
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who settle and would be considered prevailing parties under
the catalyst theory.
Even when private settlement agreements become part of
the official record, parents may be denied prevailing party
status under Buckhannon. In Louis R. v. Joliet Township High
School District, 152 "plaintiffs contend[ed that] the mediation
agreement read into the record before a hearing officer should
be construed as a consent decree for purposes of assessing
prevailing party status" under the Buckhannon regime. 153 The
plaintiff was seeking to have the agreement entered as an
order as a means of ensuring that the agreement would be
enforceable. 154 The defendants argued that the agreement was
a private settlement not a consent decree because the hearing
officer did not make any findings or deliver a ruling. 155 Relying
on the definition of consent decree provided by Barron's Law
Dictionary, 156 the District Court rejected the plaintiffs
characterization of the mediation agreement, 157 and held that
without the Hearing Officer's explicit approval, entering the
agreement into the record did not convert the agreement into a
consent decree. Accordingly, plaintiffs were not entitled to
"prevailing party" status under Buckhannon and could not
invoke the attorney fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA. 158
C. The Impact of Buckhannon

J.S., J.C., and Louis R. all strictly apply Buckhannon
illustrating how Buckhannon's holding undermines Congress'
intent to promote early resolution of IDEA disputes. 159 The
IDEA is designed for school personnel and parents to work

152. Luis R., v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist., 2002 WL 54544 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see also supra n. 150.
156. Id. (citing Steven H. Gifis, Barron's Law Dictionary 97 (4th ed., Barron's
Educ. Series, Inc. 1996) (emphasis added) (A consent decree is "a contract of the parties
entered upon the record with the approval and sanction of a court of competent
jurisdiction, which cannot be set aside without the consent of the parties ...."). See
also supra n. 142.
157. For sources discussing the role of legal dictionaries in judicial decisionmaking, see supra n. 142.
158. Luis R., 2002 WL 54544 at 3. This District Court also cited to Buckhannon,
532 U.S. at 603 n. 7 ("Private settlement agreements do not entail the judicial approval
and oversight involved in consent decrees.").
159. Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 26-27 (May 9, 1997).
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together to determine the appropriate education for a given
disabled child. 160 Indeed, this is a purpose of both the IEP
requirement and the opportunity for early resolution of
disputes through mediation. 161 If parents and school personnel
cannot agree in the IEP meeting, the parties generally proceed
to mediation where a third party neutral controls the process
and assists parties in coming to an agreement. Attorneys can
represent both parties in mediation. 162 Before Buckhannon, in
those cases in which the mediation resulted in an agreement as
to the appropriate educational plan for the disabled child, the
parties entered into a settlement agreement. If the agreement
provided the parents substantially all of the relief they were
seeking, the parents' attorney could seek reasonable fees from
the school district after the mediation. In this situation,
parents would be the prevailing party under the catalyst
theory, and the school district would be responsible for the
parents' reasonable attorneys' fees. 163 Importantly, and as the
IDEA intended, the focus of the mediation was the disabled
child's unique needs and the educational plan designed to meet
those needs.
As an example, a typical dispute may involve the quantity
of a related service such as speech therapy. Hypothetically, the
160. ld. at 25 (May 9, 1997); see also Philip T.K. Daniel, Education for Students
with Special Needs: The Judicially Defined Role of the Parents in the Process, 29 J. L. &
Educ. 1 (2000).
161. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e).
162. Per federal law, states offer mediation as preliminary to the due process
hearing and with adherence to the due process hearing timeline requirements. (For
example, a decision must be rendered within 45 days of a party filing for a due process
hearing. 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 (1999).) As with due process hearings, parties have a
right to attorney representation at these mediations. 34 C.F.R. § 300.509(a)(l) (1999).
Federal law neither prohibits nor requires attorney representation during mediation.
See Sen. Rpt. 105-17, 26 (May 9, 1997). Some states offer mediation without any
requirement that a party file for a hearing. In this type of mediation, some states
prohibit attorney representation. For example in California, "[i]t is the intent of the
Legislature that parties to special education disputes be encouraged to seek resolution
through
mediation
prior
to
filing
a
request
for
a
due
process
hearing ... attorneys ... shall not attend or otherwise participate in the prehearing
request mediation conferences." Cal. Code of Educ. § 56500.3(a) (2003). There are no
public data on how many parents participate in these prehearing request mediation
conferences. However, a proposed bill, Cal. Assembly 164, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess. (Jan.
31, 2001), to compel parents to attend information sessions explaining the advantages
of these mediation sessions was recently proposed. Perhaps because there is concern
that time devoted to prehearing mediation may delay enforcement of due process
rights, the bill has been on inactive status for some time.
163. See e.g. E.M., 849 F. Supp. 312.
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school district's speech therapist may believe that twenty
minutes of individual speech therapy per week is the
appropriate amount of therapy. The parents may obtain an
independent evaluation by an outside speech therapist
indicating that the child requires two hours per week of speech
therapy. If the amount of speech therapy the child should
receive cannot be resolved in the IEP meeting, the parents may
request a due process hearing to resolve the matter. Before the
hearing there may be a voluntary mediation. 164
In the mediation, if the parties hypothetically agreed that
forty minutes of individual speech therapy per week and fortyminutes of group speech therapy per week would be reasonably
calculated to help the child achieve his IEP goals, then the
parties would enter into a settlement agreement. In this
example, pre-Buckhannon, the mediation need not have
considered the issue of the plaintiffs attorneys' fees because in
most jurisdictions, these fees would have been available under
the catalyst theory.l 65 Under Buckhannon, if the plaintiffs
attorneys' fees are not made part of the formal mediation
agreement, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would obtain them
under the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA as now
interpreted. There would be a private settlement agreement
without judicial imprimatur, and as per the case of J.S., the
plaintiffs would not be the "prevailing party," even though they
had substantially achieved the relief they were seeking. 166
In this hypothetical, the annual monetary value of the
incremental increase in speech therapy would be $2,500. 16 7
The cost of the independent speech evaluation, the attorney's
preparation time, and the attorney's mediation time could
easily exceed this amount. Thus, the parents would have
incurred substantial financial risk in seeking to ensure that
164. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e).
165. See supra n. 114.
166. J.S., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570.
167. Typical fees for speech therapists in an urban area are about $90 per hour for
individual therapy, $45 per hour for group therapy. See Am. Speech-LanguageHearing Assn., 2002 Medicare Physician Fee Schedule for Speech-Language Specialists
and Audiologists <http://professional.asha.org/resources/reimbursement> (accessed
Jan. 14, 2003). In this example, the school district's initial offer of twenty minutes per
week individual therapy would have an estimated annual monetary value of $30 X 42
weeks (per school year) = $1,260. The hypothetical settlement provided for forty
minutes of individual therapy and forty minutes of group therapy per week. The
annual monetary value of that therapy would be ($60 x 42) + ($30 x 42) = $3,780. The
incremental increase would then be $3,780 - $1,260 = $2,520.
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their child received the amount of speech therapy that was
appropriate for his needs.
The lesson is clear: after Buckhannon, plaintiffs must
either make the matter of attorneys' fees a negotiating issue in
the settlement discussions or choose to appear pro se at the
mediation where the school district may be represented by an
attorney well-versed in the intricacies of special education law.
Under Buckhannon, parents and school districts may find that
the mediation process is degenerating into a bargaining session
where the parties trade pieces of a child's educational program
for reimbursement of attorneys' fees.
In addition, since
attorneys' fees are usually significant relative costs, the change
in the dynamics of mediation under the Buckhannon regime
dramatically shifts the power balance in favor of the defendant.
Represented parents whose school districts refuse to include
their attorneys' fees in a negotiated settlement have an
incentive to proceed to hearing so as to attain prevailing party
status. Unfortunately, the risks for such parents are great.
They may lose at hearing, but even if they win, the relief they
are awarded may be substantially the same relief they were
offered in the mediation. If this occurs, there is current
statutory language in the IDEA that may deny them attorneys'
fees despite their prevailing party status. 168 These changes
defeat the intent of the IDEA in two ways: first, they
discourage parents from initiating disputes to obtain a F APE
for their child; and second, they encourage parents who do
initiate such suits to prolong them to achieve prevailing party
status. The intent of the IDEA to have all parties focused on
the best interests of the child is easily lost under these new
dynamics.
168. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i) (1997) reads as follows:
Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be reimbursed
in any action or proceeding under this section for services performed
subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent if~
(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at
any time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins;
(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief fmally
obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of
settlement.
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The IDEA promoted procedure over substance in its effort
to guarantee disabled children a F APE.
In Rowley, the
Supreme Court accepted this ascendance of procedure over
substance because the Court recognized that the substance of a
unique disabled child's education was not a matter for the
federal courts ultimately to decide.l 69 The Court also relied on
parents acting as private attorney generals in enforcing the
IDEA, as Congress intended.l 70 Writing for the Court in
Rowley, Justice Rehnquist noted that "[a]s this very case
demonstrates, parents and guardians will not lack ardor in
seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of the
benefits to which they are entitled by the Act." 171 Congress,
through its attorney fee-shifting legislation and provisions,
sought to buttress this parental ardor.
Unfortunately,
Buckhannon has dramatically limited the ability of parents to
privately enforce the IDEA. Now parents may have plenty of
ardor, but lack the funds to pursue their child's educational
entitlements. Ardor in the face of large attorneys' bills is
naturally tempered.
After Buckhannon, for parents to assert their disabled
child's right to a FAPE, they must risk the possibility of the
defense rendering their case moot. Becoming the prevailing
party by obtaining judicially sanctioned relief is the only
guarantee to parents that they will not be liable for attorneys'
fees in excess of the value of the relief they receive. Yet
whether parents obtain the necessary judicial imprimatur
depends, in large part, on the willingness of defendants to
contest matters through judgment.
Defendants may
unilaterally grant relief well into hearings, leaving parents
holding the bag for their own attorneys' fees. In Buckhannon,
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[a]nd petitioners' fear of
mischievous defendants only materializes in claims for
equitable relief, for so long as the plaintiff has a cause of action
for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the
case." 172 IDEA claims are just the sort of claims for equitable

169. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208.
170. The Senate Report accompanying the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA, for
example, notes: "The procedural safeguards in the IDEA have historically provided the
foundation for ensuring access to a free appropriate public education for children with
disabilities." Sen. Rpt. 105-17, at 25 (May 9, 1997).
171. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 209.
172. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608-09.
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relief to which he alludes. Compensatory money damages are
never available under the IDEA; at most, compensatory
education is the remedy available for school district
misconduct. 173 Under IDEA, pursuit of prospective, equitable
relief is available, encouraged, and often sought either alone or
along with retrospective claims. The procedural safeguards of
IDEA supported by state-imposed statutes of limitation
encourage speedy resolution of disputes. 174 In addition, there is
consensus that early intervention is often a key to success in
educating disabled children. 175 These factors lead to claims
that are relatively small in total value. Thus, in IDEA claims,
the attorneys' fees can easily surpass the value of any relief
obtained. With the mooting that Buckhannon encourages,
parents are at greater financial risk.
Parents, nevertheless, often need attorneys to assert their
disabled children's rights to a FAPE. Although parents are
allowed to represent their own children pro se in
administrative hearings and no attorney is necessary to use a
state's complaint resolution procedures, many factors
discourage parents from acting on their own behalf in these
proceedings. Despite being called "administrative hearings" or
"complaints," these proceedings require fluency in English, an
ability to understand detailed state and federal statutes, and
an ability to present a case with evidence, witnesses, legal
motions, and briefs before a hearing officer who will adhere to
the evidentiary and procedural standards appropriate to
litigation in federal courts. Educational and time limitations
make it impossible for the vast majority of parents to proceed
with these mechanisms without the aid of an advocate or
attorney. The situation in federal courts is even more difficult.
Federal judges largely have banned non-attorney parents from
representing their children in their courts. 176 So, regardless of

173. See e.g. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275 ("Although the IDEA allows courts to grant
'such relief as the court determines is appropriate,' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(iii),
ordinarily monetary damages are not available under that statute.").
174. See e.g. Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(j) (2003), which provides that "[a]ny request
for a due process hearing ... shall be filed within three years from the date the party
initiating the request knew or had reason to know of the facts underlying the basis for
the request."
175. Amanda J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001).
176. Collinsgru v. Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225 (3rd Cir. 1998). See also Devine v.
Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 176 (11th Cir. 1997); ,Johns v. County of San
Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-877 (9th Cir. 1997); Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found., 906
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the size of the claim, parents must have attorneys to pursue
their claims in federal courts. Under the Buckhannon regime
then, parents pursuing IDEA claims in federal court risk
defense rendering their cases moot up until the eve of
judgment, and since parents are banned from representing
their children in federal courts, Buckhannon has dramatically
increased the financial risks to parents. Parents must now
choose between assuming these daunting risks and not
asserting their child's rights to a FAPE.
Equal protection for disabled children will suffer as parents
do their own cost-benefit analysis. The result will be the cost to
society of less-educated, disabled citizens who have diminished
chances for self-sufficiency.
This was not the intent of
Congress. When the earlier Supreme Court decision in Smith
made attorneys' fees unavailable to parents, Congress passed
the Handicapped Children's Protection Act. In the report
accompanying that Act, the Senate wrote, "Congress' original
intent was that due process procedures, including the right to
litigation if that became necessary, be available to all
parents." 177 After Buckhannon, the greater risk to parents of
non-recovery of attorneys' fees makes this egalitarian intent
even less realistic.
V.

POTENTIAL REMEDIES TO THE BUCKHANNON PROBLEM

IN

IDEA LITIGATION
A. Court-Based Remedies

The lower federal courts, through their interpretive
discretion, offer a potential means of restoring the preBuckhannon fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA.
The
incentives of those provisiOns more closely track the
congressional intent of contributing to the active and
egalitarian enforcement of the Act. This process seems to be
under way, in part, as the lower federal courts have not
uniformly applied the broad Buckhannon holding.
For
example, two circuits have relaxed their interpretations of
prevailing party status despite Buckhannon's judicial
imprimatur requirement. In John and Leigh T. v. Iowa
F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (lOth Cir. 1986).
177. Sen. Rpt. 99-112, at 2 (July 25, 1985).
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Department of Education, 178 the Eighth Circuit held the Iowa
Department of Education responsible for attorneys' fees even
though the plaintiffs had been adjudicated prevailing parties
only in their action against the local school district, not in their
action against the state department. 179
On appeal, the
plaintiffs had joined the state department of education as
defendants. 180 The Eighth Circuit reasoned that, although the
plaintiffs prevailed against the local school district, the state
department of education should bear responsibility for some of
the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 181 This is because the state
department had direct authority over and had assisted the
local school district in vigorously defending the case .182
In Barrios v. California Interscholastic Federation, a panel
of the Ninth Circuit held that it was not bound by the "dictum
in Buckhannon [that] suggests that a plaintiff 'prevails' only
when he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or
enters into a court supervised consent decree .... "183 This
"dictum" was precisely the "authority" that the Southern
District of New York and Northern District of Illinois had
relied upon in deciding the J.S. and Louis R. cases. 184
Victor Barrios was a paraplegic high school baseball coach
whom the California Interscholastic Federation (CJF) had
randomly prohibited from using his athletic wheelchair when
doing on-field coaching. 185 He filed suit under the ADA seeking
compensatory damages and injunctive relief. 186 He and CIF
reached a settlement agreement in which he received $10,000
in damages and a commitment to allow him to coach his team
from his wheelchair during games.l 87 The Ninth Circuit found
that Barrios qualified as a "prevailing party" under the ADA
fee-shifting provisions, even without a judicial imprimatur of
the settlement, because Barrios received the relief he sought,
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

258 F. 3d 860 (8th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 865.
Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fedn., 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002),
cert. denied, Cal. Interscholastic Fedn v. Barrios, 123 S. Ct. 98 (2002) (citing
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n. 7).
184. J. S., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570; Luis R., 2002 WL 54544 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
185. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1130.
186. Id. at 1132.
187. Id. at 1133.
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the relief was memorialized in an enforceable settlement
agreement, and that relief was not de minimus. 188 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that it was bound not by the dicta in
Buckhannon, but by its own holding in Fischer v. SJB-P.D.
Jnc. 189 that a plaintiff also "prevails" when he or she enters into
a legally enforceable settlement agreement against the
defendant. 190
In Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 191 the Central District
Court of California also chose not to follow the broader
interpretation of Buckhannon. Instead, the court chose to
apply the Barrios holding. The plaintiffs in Ostby were the
parents of Elise Ostby, a teenager with Asperger's Syndrome (a
form of autism) and other related disabilities. 192 They filed for
a due process hearing seeking retroactive reimbursement and
prospective payment of a residential placement that the
parents had unilaterally chosen for Elise after they had gone
through a protracted period of frustration securing appropriate
services from the defendant high school district. 193
In
mediation, the parties had reached an agreement that gave the
parents all of the relief they were seeking, including the
defendant's commitment to pay for Elise's placement in the
future. 194 The mediation agreement "was in writing, was
signed by the parties and by the mediation officer assigned to
the case and was filed with the [California] Special Education
Hearing Office." 195 The district court held that this agreement,
even though it did not have a judicial imprimatur, gave the
parents "prevailing party" status for purposes of the IDEA
attorney fee-shifting provisions. 196 Ostby was the first IDEA
188. Id.
189. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2000).
190. Fisher, 214 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111-112, 113), "[A]
plaintiff 'prevails' when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the
legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way
that directly benefits the plaintiff." The Court explained that "[n]o material alteration
of the legal relationship occurs the plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment,
consent decree, or settlement against the defendant." In these situations, the legal
relationship is altered because the plaintiff can force the defendant to do something he
otherwise would not have to do.)
191. Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 209 F. Supp. 2d. 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
192. Id. at 1036.
193. ld.
194. ld. at 1037.
195. Id.
196. ld. at 1042.
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case within the Ninth Circuit to apply the Barrios holding. The
District Court noted that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Barrios
and the Second Circuit's holding in the J.C. case represent
conflicting applications of Buckhannon. 197 "Thus, in the Ninth
Circuit, unlike in the Second Circuit, a plaintiff who obtains a
private settlement against a defendant is a 'prevailing party'
for purposes of federal fee-shifting statutes." 198
In the Northern District of Illinois, one court has found that
the Buckhannon holding does not apply to the IDEA. In TD u.
La Grange School District, Judge Zagel concluded:
. . . I believe there exist critical distinctions in the text
and structure of the IDEA and the ADA and FHAA that
persuade me that the Court's ruling in Buckhannon was
not meant to extend to the IDEA and, accordingly, does
not control the interpretation of the term "prevailing
party" in the attorneys' fees provision of the IDEA. 199
To reach this conclusion, the TD court reasoned from the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in Crabill u. Trans Union L.L.C. 200 in
which the court undertook a comparison of the text, structure,
and legislative history of the attorney fee-shifting provisions of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) with the fee-shifting
provisions under consideration in Buckhannon. The Crabill
court concluded:
"We cannot find anything in the text,
structure, or legislative history of the [Fair Credit Reporting]
Act to suggest that its attorneys' fee provision has a different
meaning from the provision at issue in Buckhannon." 201
Therefore, in Crabill, the Seventh Circuit held that the
Buckhannon holding applied to the FCRA.
Applying the methodology of the Crabill court, the district
court in TD found material differences between the attorneys'
fee provision of the IDEA and the statutes under consideration
in Buckhannon.
Since the IDEA specifically mentioned
settlement as a basis for the awarding of attorneys' fees to
parents and the IDEA specifically delineated certain instances,
not including settlement agreements, when attorneys' fees
197. Id. at 1041.
198. Id. at 1041 (citing Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134; Johnson v. D.C., 190 F. Supp. 2d
34, 44 (D.D.C. 2002)).
199. TD v. La Grange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
200. Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2001).
201. Id. at 667.
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would be prohibited, the TD court found settlement agreements
to be eligible for an award of fees. 202 Notably, the TD court's
ruling is in direct disagreement with its sister court in Louis R.
Barrios and Ostby indicate that in the Ninth Circuit
plaintiffs in certain actions, including IDEA actions, may still
obtain prevailing party status through private settlement
agreements. TD seems to follow this development. This trend
may continue as more courts apply Buckhannon.
In some jurisdictions, plaintiffs may circumvent the
Buckhannon problem through a temporary restraining order
(TRO). In Johnny's Icehouse, Inc., v. Amateur Hockey
Association of Illinois, a Title IX action, the plaintiff sought a
TR0. 203 Since there were findings of fact by the court in
granting the TRO, the court later held that the TRO was
sufficient to deem the plaintiff a "prevailing party" under the
Buckhannon regime, even when the defendant provided relief
before the matter was finally adjudicated. 204
The court
determined that the TRO served as a court-approved finding of
fact on the merits of plaintiffs case, namely a form of judicial
imprimatur. Perhaps the success of this argument in Johnny's
Icehouse may cause plaintiffs in special education litigation to
seek temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions.
However, the so-called "stay-put" provisions of the IDEA and
the education statutes of the several states make injunctions
based on findings of fact more difficult to obtain. 205
202. Judge Zagel noted that
[u]nlike the ADA or the FHAA, the IDEA specifically addresses settlement as
a basis for the award of attorneys' fees. For example, the IDEA specifically
provides for a reduction in recoverable fees when parents reject timely,
reasonable settlement offers. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D). Moreover, the IDEA
provides that parents may be awarded attorneys' fees when they are the
prevailing party 'in any action or proceeding brought under this section,'
including, under certain circumstances, 'for a mediation described in
subsection (e) of this section that is conducted prior to the filing of a
complaint.' 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii). Finally, because Congress specifically
delineated certain instances when attorneys' fees are prohibited under IDEA,
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(ii), but did not exclude settlement agreements from
being eligible for the award of attorneys' fees, settlement agreements are
presumptively eligible for such an award of attorneys' fees.
TD, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 1063.
203. 2001 WL 893840 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2001).
204. Id. at 3.
205. As part of the procedural safeguards of the IDEA, there is a so-called "stayput" provision that maintains a student's current educational placement during the
pendency of a due process hearing. "During the pendency of any proceedings conducted
pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents
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Despite a few divergent opmwns, and the long-shot
potential of the preliminary injunction, the strong trend
appears to be for courts to follow Buckhannon's narrow
definition of prevailing party. 206 To preserve the private cause
of action as a means of enforcing the IDEA, Congress must act
to restore some form of the catalyst theory in the attorney feeshifting provisions of the Act.

B. The Need for a Congressional Remedy
As demonstrated above, the Buckhannon decision has
created a problem for civil rights' plaintiffs. With regard to the
IDEA, Congress can solve the problem created by Buckhannon
quite readily. Congress intervened when, in its 1984 Smith
decision, the Supreme Court held that civil rights laws and the
rehabilitation act did not apply to handicapped children.
Congress can intervene again post-Buckhannon to protect the
rights of disabled children.
In the area of special education, all involved, whether
federal courts, state officials, local school personnel, or parents,
have an obligation to place the interests of the disabled child
above all other interests. As demonstrated above, Buckhannon
significantly impairs parties' abilities to share this overarching
goal. Rules like the one from Buckhannon that encourage
school districts to save funds by tactically "sticking" parents
with attorneys' fees will inevitably distract from the
preeminence of the child's interests. Parents, now facing much
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of
such child .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). Most states have similar statutory provisions for
their due process hearings. See e.g. CaL Educ. Code § 56505(d). The stay-put provisions
are a form of preliminary injunction, and the federal stay-put provision "substitutes an
absolute rule in favor of the status quo for the court's discretionary consideration of the
factors of irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or a fair
ground for litigation and a balance of the hardships." Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904,
906 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoted in Johnson v. Spec. Educ. Hearing Off, St. of Cal., 387 F.3d
1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859 (3d Cir.
1996); Bd. of Educ. of Community High Sch. Dist. No. 218, Cook County v. Ill. St. Bd. of
Educ. 103 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 1996). However, the Ninth Circuit, in Johnson, held that
a plaintiffs request to enjoin a preexisting stay-put order, viz. one issued under State
law, would be appropriately handled by a district court using the traditional analysis of
"(1) a combination of probable success and the possibility of irreparable harm, or (2)
that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardship tips in (plaintiffs] favor."
Johnson, 387 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. v. PPR
Realty Inc., 204 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 2000)).
206. Ronald D. Wenkart, Attorneys Fees Under the IDEA and the Demise of the
Catalyst Theory, 165 Educ. L. Rep. 2 (2002).
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greater financial risk if they seek to ensure their disabled
child's appropriate education through the IDEA procedural
safeguards, naturally will be deterred. The detriment is to the
disabled child, and ultimately to the society that must provide
for those disabled individuals who are less capable of selfsufficiency in adulthood. 207
Certain provisions of the IDEA that are currently in place
could forestall some of the unintended negative outcomes
Buckhannon has engendered. For example, the IDEA allows
courts to penalize defendants who would "unilaterally moot an
action before judgment in an effort to avoid an award of
attorney's fees." 208 This is not a good solution, however,
because it contravenes another oft-repeated Supreme Court

207. Even before Buckhannon, the special education defense bar bemoaned the
ascendancy of tactics over merit in resolving disputes concerning appropriate education
for disabled children. A typical defense criticism of procedural safeguards of the IDEA
has been that "... the threat of losing at a due process hearing and needing to
reimburse the parents for attorneys' fees in addition to the cost for services encourages
school districts to settle many cases. In fact, even cases with questionable merit are
often settled because a cost-benefit analysis does not warrant spending public funds
and dedicating the administrative time necessary to litigate." Bridget A. Flanagan &
Chad J. Graff, Federal Mandate to Educate Disabled Students Doesn't Cover Costs. 47
Fed. Law. 22, 27 (Sept. 2000). Ironically, Buckhannon now has made the stakes even
higher for school districts, as the incentive has shifted for parents to seek a judicial
imprimatur in hearings carried through to judgment to ensure their reimbursement of
attorneys' fees.
208. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 608. In the IDEA there is an exception to reduction
of [plaintiffs'] attorneys' fee award: "The provisions of subparagraph (F) shall not apply
in any action or proceeding if the court finds that the State or local educational agency
unreasonably protracted the final resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a
violation of this section." 20 U.S.C. § 14l5(i)(3)(G) (1997).
Subparagraph (F) Reduction in amount of attorneys' fees reads as follows:
Except as provided in subparagraph (G), whenever the court finds that(i) the parent, during the course of the action or proceeding, unreasonably
protracted the final resolution of the controversy;
(ii) the amount of the attorneys' fees otherwise authorized to be awarded
unreasonably exceeds the hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar
services by attorneys of reasonably comparable skill, reputation, and
experience;
(iii) the time spent and legal services furnished were excessive considering
the nature of the action or proceeding; or
(iv) the attorney representing the parent did not provide to the school district
the appropriate information in the due process complaint in accordance with
subsection (b)(7) of this section;
the court shall reduce, accordingly, the amount of the attorneys' fees awarded
under this section.
20 U.S.C. § l415(i)(3)(F) (1997).
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admonition that fee-shifting provisions should not engender a
second major litigation. 209
The best solution is congressional revision of the IDEA to
provide for some form of catalyst theory or a broader definition
of prevailing party for purposes of the fee-shifting provisions. 210
Both Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, and
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Buckhannon,
suggest that congressional response may well be appropriate in
light of the Court's holding. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, expresses discomfort with the judicial
discretion offered by the catalyst theory: "In Alyeska. .. , we
said that Congress had not 'extended any roving authority to
the Judiciary to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise
whenever the courts might deem them warranted."' 211 In his
concurring opinion, Justice Scalia acknowledged that Congress
may wish to act:
The Court today concludes that a party cannot be
deemed to have prevailed, for purposes of fee-shifting
statues such as 42. U.S.C. §§ 1988, 3613(c)(2), unless
there has been an enforceable "alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties." That is the normal meaning
of "prevailing party" in litigation, and there is no proper
basis for departing from that normal meaning. Congress
is free, of course, to revise these provisions-but it is my
guess that if it does so it will not create the sort of
inequity that the catalyst theory invites, but will
require the court to determine that there was at least a
substantial likelihood that the party requesting fees
would have prevailed. 21 2

209. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 609 ("We have also stated that '[a] request for
attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation,' Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed.2d 40 (1983), and have accordingly avoided an
interpretation of the fee-shifting statutes that would have 'spawn[ed] a second
litigation of significant dimension,' Garland, 489 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 1486.")
210. A congressional overturning of the entire Buckhannon decision would also
solve the problem. For example, the Vermont Bar Association adopted a resolution in
September 2001 calling upon the Vermont congressional delegation to "take all steps
necessary to introduce, support, and enact federal legislation that would overturn the
Buckhannon decision ..." 0. Whitman Smith, Erosion of Civil Rights Enforcement:
Judicial Constriction of the Civil Rights and Disability Bar, 28 Vt. B. J. & L. Dig. 41,
42 (2002).
211. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Socy., 421 U.S. 240, 260 (1975)).
212. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622.
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Both Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Scalia's statements
suggest that congressional action is the appropriate remedy for
the Buckhannon decision.
Given the textualist requirements of the current Court's
majority, 213 and Buckhannon's reliance on Black's Law
Dictionary for the dispositive definition of "prevailing party," if
Congress wishes to reincorporate the advantages of a modified
"catalyst theory" into special education litigation, Congress
must provide statutory text specifically redefining "prevailing
party" for the purposes of the IDEA. 214
The current attorney fee-shifting sections of the IDEA
contain the following provision:
In any action or proceeding brought under this section,
the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable
attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a
child with a disability who is the prevailing party. 215
Although there is no mention in this section that the "action or
proceeding" result in a judgment or consent decree before a
court may award attorneys' fees, to satisfy the requirements of
Buckhannon, Congress should amend this single provision.
Congress should insert language indicating that a court may
deem a child with a disability the prevailing party and thus
award parents their fees if the parents obtain either a
judgment, a legally enforceable consent decree, or an
enforceable settlement agreement. 216 Congress may even go

213. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's textualist approach to statutory
interpretation, see supra n. 142.
·
214. Naturally, clarity of text is relative and a matter of perception. Unanticipated
ambiguities do arise. When these ambiguities arise, textualist judges rely upon the
common law cannons of construction. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning:"
Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub.
Policy 401, 472 (1994) (cited in Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating
Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, Berkeley J. Empl. &
Lab. L. 53, 88 (2000)). See also Buzbee, supra n. 142, at 249. Congress must be careful
to ensure that its clear language in the amended statute is readily amenable to a plain
meaning interpretation.
215. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997).
216. Currently in the IDEA there is some discussion of parents rejecting good
faith, substantial settlement offers. When parents do reject such offers, the court may
deny them attorneys' fee recovery:
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D) (1997)-"Prohibition of attorneys' fees and related
costs for certain services"
(i) Attorneys' fees may not be awarded and related costs may not be
reimbursed in any action or proceeding under this section for services
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further and fully revive the catalyst theory in special education
litigation. They could do this by incorporating language that
provides courts with the authority to deem parents "prevailing
parties" when they have substantially achieved the relief they
were seeking, regardless of judicial imprimatur or other formal
outcome, and so long as the parents can demonstrate a causal
connection between their proceeding or action and the
defendant's action providing relief. 217 Such a modification of
the attorneys' fee provisions will first sustain the congressional
intent that attorneys' fee recovery be available to parents in
special education litigation, and secondly, the modification
would provide the statutory language to satisfy the current
textualist Supreme Court majority.
Other qualifications contained in the IDEA attorney feeshifting provision such as the provisions that prohibit the court
from awarding attorneys' fees if parents unjustifiably reject a
substantial settlement offer (see supra) underscore Congress'
intent to encourage the bringing and speedy resolution of
meritorious claims regardless of the parents' ability to pay for
an attorney. 218 These fee-shifting provisions are a strong
means to further the objectives of the IDEA, namely the
provision to each disabled child of a F APE designed to meet the
child's unique needs.
After Buckhannon, even if Congress chooses not to amend
the general fee-shifting provision, 219 it should amend that
portion of the IDEA attorney fee-shifting provisions that calls
for sanctions against school districts or local educational
agencies that unnecessarily protract litigation. Currently, the
statute reads as follows: "The provisions of subparagraph (F)
performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent
if(I) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at
any time more than 10 days before the proceeding begins;
(II) the offer is not accepted within 10 days; and
(III) the court or administrative hearing officer finds that the relief finally
obtained by the parents is not more favorable to the parents than the offer of
settlement.
However, there is no explicit text in the current IDEA statute indicating that a parent
or guardian who obtains an enforceable settlement agreement would be a "prevailing
party" for purposes of the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions.
217. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
218. Sen. Rpt. 105-17 (May 9, 1997).
219. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997).
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(prohibiting attorneys' fees to parents] shall not apply in any
action or proceeding if the court finds that the State or local
educational agency unreasonably protracted the final
resolution of the action or proceeding or there was a violation of
this section." 22° Congress must change the law to overtly alert
courts to enforce this existing section. Then, defendants in
special education litigation could less easily tactically moot
cases to avoid attorneys' fees. Overall, in combination with
permitting the use of a revised catalyst theory in the awarding
of fees, the amendments to the IDEA's fee-shifting provisions 221
should realign the incentives associated with the attorney feeshifting provisions of the IDEA so that they are once again
consistent with the goals of the IDEA.
Congress must act to restore a version of the catalyst theory
acceptable to the Court in the attorney fee-shifting provisions
of the IDEA. This will reduce the cost of litigation for parents,
reduce the number and duration of cases, and more likely
preserve IDEA's intent, providing equal protection to disabled
children.
VI. CONCLUSION

Buckhannon's rejection of the catalyst theory in attorney
fee-shifting provisions of civil rights statutes has impaired
parents' ability to enforce their disabled children's right to a
F APE. By limiting prevailing party status to those plaintiffs
who obtain judicial imprimaturs through judgments or courtordered consent decrees, Buckhannon has effectively reduced
the number of disabled children who will receive a F APE.
Under Buckhannon, even plaintiffs who "win" can easily "lose."
Without a judicial imprimatur, "winning" parents who have
obtained a F APE for their disabled child will often be liable for
attorneys' fees far in excess of their "winning" claim's value.
This outcome denies disabled children their equal protection
rights, is contrary to the intent of the IDEA, and ultimately
burdens society with more disabled adults who have not
achieved
self-sufficiency
and
independence
through
appropriate education.

220. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(G) (1997).
221. 20 U.S.C § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997).
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In some jurisdictions, court-based solutions to the
Buckhannon problem in special education litigation are
emerging. However, in light of the Court's reliance on Black's
Law Dictionary in Buckhannon and the Court's preference for
textualist statutory interpretation, Congress should carefully
revise the text of the IDEA statute. This would be the quickest
and most viable remedy available. Congress must redefine
"prevailing party" for purposes of the IDEA and perhaps
provide the statutory text necessary to delineate the specific
boundaries of an acceptable catalyst theory within the attorney
fee-shifting provisions of the Act.

